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Abstract
Background: Pandemic influenza A (H1N1) 2009 has posed a serious public health challenge world-wide. In absence of
reliable information on severity of the disease, the nations are unable to decide on the appropriate response against this
disease.
Methods: Based on the results of laboratory investigations, attendance in outpatient department, hospital admissions and
mortality from the cases of influenza like illness from 1 August to 31 October 2009 in Pune urban agglomeration, risk of
hospitalization and case fatality ratio were assessed to determine the severity of pandemic H1N1 and seasonal influenza-A
infections.
Results: Prevalence of pandemic H1N1 as well as seasonal-A cases were high in Pune urban agglomeration during the study
period. The cases positive for pandemic H1N1 virus had significantly higher risk of hospitalization than those positive for
seasonal influenza-A viruses (OR: 1.7). Of 93 influenza related deaths, 57 and 8 deaths from Pune (urban) and 27 and 1 death
from Pune (rural) were from pandemic H1N1 positive and seasonal-A positive cases respectively. The case fatality ratio
0.86% for pandemic H1N1 was significantly higher than that of seasonal-A (0.13%) and it was in category 3 of the pandemic
severity index of CDC, USA. The data on the cumulative fatality of rural and urban Pune revealed that with time the
epidemic is spreading to rural areas.
Conclusions: The severity of the H1N1 influenza pandemic is less than that reported for ‘Spanish flu 1918’ but higher than
other pandemics of the 20th century. Thus, pandemic influenza should be considered as serious health threat and
unprecedented global response seems justified.
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Introduction
Emergence of the influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (pandemic
H1N1) posed new challenges to the public health systems and
communities all over the world. Global actions by international
agencies and highly vigilant media generated tremendous fear
resulting into unprecedented response to the new pandemic by
majority of the nations. However, it is not clear that the fear
generated was in proportion to the risk that this virus presents.
As of 6 December 2009, worldwide more than 208 countries
had reported laboratory confirmed cases of pandemic H1N1,
including at least 9596 deaths [1]. It is well established that the
virus is highly transmissible as it has spread to large number of
countries within a short period of time. However, there are
divergent views regarding severity of this disease [2–6]. Mexico,
Thailand and Japan reported higher severity whereas Canada,
USA, Australia and many European countries treat it at par with
seasonal influenza. Research on previous pandemic strains of
influenza suggested that mortality can vary widely between
different countries, with mortality being concentrated in develop-
ing countries [7]. It is also argued that pandemic H1N1 should be
taken seriously as a public health threat and underestimation of
the menace by the virus may be by far more dangerous than the
overestimation [8]. Therefore, there is need to conduct systematic
epidemiological studies in different real time situations.
The pandemic has created tremendous hardship on already
overburdened health system in developing nations but unprece-
dented surveillance has also provided opportunity to study
different epidemiological parameters including disease severity of
influenza viruses in tropical settings like India. Understanding of
severity is central to health care planning for management of the
pandemic in the future and to avoid wastage of resources in
resource poor settings. Better estimates will also facilitate
identification of risk factors between and within populations and
regions. Policy regarding social distancing, school closures,
diagnosis of patients, vaccination etc would be greatly influenced
by these estimates.
Severity of infection can be assessed by different approaches.
One is to explore different genetic markers of the virus that are
known to be associated with severe influenza. The current
circulating pandemic H1N1 does not contain the known
molecular markers of pathogenicity and transmissibility [4,9].
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However, absence of known markers does not necessarily indicate
that the virus is benign and previously unrecognized molecular
determinants could be responsible for transmission among
humans. Another is the epidemiological approach. Several
epidemiological methods have been proposed by different workers
for estimation of case fatality ratio (CFR) [7,10,11]. Recently,
Garske et al [12] provided a simple 2 stage method for
computation of CFR. The first stage involved a short period,
usually in the beginning after declaration of the epidemic, for
which reliable data is available on all the cases. This data was used
for determination of ratio between the hospitalized cases and the
total cases, termed as hospitalization ratio. As epidemic grows,
significant under reporting of mild cases may occur as people who
have mild infection will not present to health care and this is likely
to grow as epidemic advances and pressure on public health
increases. Similarly, the attending clinicians, with advancement of
epidemic, may lose interest in detection and reporting of all the
cases. However, it is believed that the hospitalization and fatality
reporting will not be affected in the same manner and proper
reporting will continue throughout the season. Thus, the
hospitalization ratio will hold good for entire season of the
transmission. In the second stage, only hospitalized cases and
deaths were used to estimate the case fatality ratio among
hospitalized cases. The overall case fatality ratio was estimated by
multiplication of the hospitalization ratio calculated in the first
stage and the case fatality ratio among hospitalized cases estimated
in the second stage.
In India, after declaration of pandemic (phase 6) by World
Health Organization (WHO) on 11 June [13], an active
surveillance was started for detection of influenza cases in persons
with travel history to influenza positive countries. All suspected
cases of pandemic H1N1 were detained and hospitalized. Only
confirmed cases were provided with antiviral treatment. In Pune,
the first pandemic H1N1 positive case was detected on 22 June
2009 in a traveler coming from USA. This was followed by 1 more
case in June and 8 cases up to 14 July. All these cases were either
persons with foreign travel history or the contacts of such persons.
The first death due to pandemic H1N1 was reported on 3 August
2009. Thereafter, the active surveillance in community was started
by screening all suspected cases of influenza.
In this communication we have followed the epidemiological
approach suggested by Garske et al (2009) to assess severity of
infection in pandemic H1N1 and seasonal influenza-A patients.
Results
Confirmed cases
Since the beginning of this pandemic, 11 May to 31 October
2009, a total of 607,117 persons presented themselves for
screening to various health centers in Pune. Of these 34,917
persons were determined as suspected cases of ILI. From 1 August
to 31 October, a total of 7,866 suspected cases were sampled for
diagnosis of influenza etiology. Frequencies of pandemic H1N1
and seasonal-A cases were 17.8% and 16.3% respectively (Table 1).
Due to heavy work load and priority for identification of pandemic
H1N1, all the influenza-A positive cases were not sub-typed. A
sub-set of 374 seasonal-A positive samples, selected randomly for
testing, yielded 86 (23%) seasonal H1N1, and 288 (77%) H3N2
virus. In a subset of 399 cases, selected randomly, only 6 were
positive for influenza-B virus.
Out-patient Department (OPD) cases
After the first death on 3 August, regular local screening of all
cases of suspected ILI was started. From the second week of
September onward, only limited samples, collected at the
discretion of the clinicians, were referred to the laboratory because
suspected cases were administered Oseltamivir without laboratory
confirmation. From 1 August to 31 October 2009, clinical samples
from 2967 suspected cases tested in laboratory yielded 18.2% and
23.2% pandemic and seasonal-A influenza respectively (Table 1).
Pandemic H1N1 cases were significantly less prevalent than
Seasonal-A cases. Among positives, male: female ratio was 1:1.6.
Seasonal-A cases were significantly higher than pandemic H1N1
cases in all age groups except in 11 to 20 years group (Figure 1). A
distinct peak in number of positive cases was observed in middle of
August but the pattern was not clear afterwards as only limited
samples were tested.
Hospitalized or In-patient Department (IPD) cases
Between 1 August to 31 October, a total of 3,300 suspected
cases were hospitalized (Table 1). Of these, 569 (17.2%) were
positive for pandemic H1N1 and 424 (12.8%) for seasonal
influenza-A viruses. The epidemic curve for hospitalized cases of
pandemic H1N1 and seasonal-A cases is presented in figure 2.
Sharp rise was observed in the number of positive cases between
5 and 28 August. Thereafter, influenza activity was very low for
about a week from 29 August to 3 September. The second rise in
number of cases was observed between 7 and 29 September. In
case of pandemic H1N1, the second rise was more stable and
comparatively high throughout the remaining part of September
and October. The seasonal-A cases declined sharply during the
last week of September. Further, number of pandemic H1N1
cases were higher than seasonal-A cases in all age groups except
in the group over 60 years (Figure 3). Male: female ratio was
1:1.4.
Risk of hospitalization and hospitalization ratio
In IPD, from 1 August to 31 Ocober 2009, out of 993 positive
cases, pandemic H1N1 cases (569, 57.3%) were significantly
Table 1. Results of the samples tested in the laboratory from 1 August to 31 October 2009.
Cases Total Influenza-A IPD cases OPD cases
Suspect
cases
Pandemic
H1N1 (%)
Seasonal-A
(%)
Suspect
cases
Pandemic
H1N1 (%)
Seasonal-A
(%)
Suspect
Cases
Pandemic
H1N1 (%)
Seasonal-A
(%)
Total 7866 1404 (17.8) 1286 (16.3) 3300 569 (17.2) 424 (12.8) 2967 541 (18.2) 687 (23.2)
Range 8–327 1–97 0–79 7–73 0–21 0–20 0–298 0–75 0–65
Daily median/Average 85.5 15.3 14 35.9 6.2 4.61 32.3 5.9 7.5
95% Confidence interval 17.0, 18.7 15.5, 17.2 16.0, 18.6 11.7, 14.0 16.9, 19.7 21.7, 24.7
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010540.t001
Severity of Pandemic Influenza
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higher than seasonal-A cases (424, 42.7%). However, in OPD, out
of 1228 positive cases, pandemic H1N1 cases (541, 44.06%) were
significantly less than seasonal-A cases (687, 55.94%) (Table 1).
Thus, the odds of hospitalization in pandemic H1N1 positive cases
were 1.7 times higher than seasonal-A positive cases [OR 1.7]. In
the early stage of the active surveillance, from 4 August to 3
September 2009, the hospitalization ratio was calculated by
dividing number of IPD cases by the number of total cases. The
ratio for pandemic and seasonal-A influenza was 8.6% and 6.8%
respectively. The ratio between hospitalized and OPD cases was
1:10.7 for pandemic H1N1 and 1:13.6 for seasonal influenza
(Table 2).
Case fatality
A total of 93 deaths were recorded in Pune district from 1
August to 31 October 2009. Of these, 57 and 8 deaths from Pune
(urban) and 27 and 1 from Pune (rural) were among pandemic
H1N1 positive and seasonal-A positive cases respectively. Of the 9
deaths associated with the seasonal influenza, 2 were positive for
seasonal H1N1 and 7 for H3N2 viruses.
The number of cumulative deaths in pandemic H1N1 positive
cases, presented in figure 4a, show significant linear trend
(R2= 0.99). The trend in hospitalization and the trend in fatality
were proportionate over a period of time, suggesting about 1 death
per 11 confirmed hospitalized cases. Significant linear trends were
also observed in cumulative deaths in pandemic H1N1 positive
cases in Pune (urban) and Pune (rural) (Figure 4b.). This revealed
that with time proportionately more deaths were recorded from
rural areas implying higher transmission and spread of pandemic
H1N1 in rural areas. This may partly be attributed to the health
seeking behavior of the rural population and also issues related to
health access. In pandemic H1N1 positive cases, deaths were
reported in all age groups, but 75% of all the deaths were in age
group of ,30 years (Figure 5a).
Figure 1. Age distribution of the OPD cases in Pune (Urban).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010540.g001
Figure 2. Epidemic curve of the confirmed IPD cases.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010540.g002
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Case Fatality Ratio (CFR)
In Pune (urban), the overall CFR for pandemic H1N1 cases
(0.86%) was significantly higher than that of seasonal-A cases
(0.13%) [P,0.001, OR 5.8, 95% CI (2.71, 13.34)]. The odds of
death in hospitalized pandemic H1N1cases was about 6 times
higher than seasonal-A cases. As suggested by Garske et al (2009),
the precision of the CFR estimates depends upon the sample size
of the cases in the first stage of the study. To obtain 95%
confidence interval, around 1100 total cases and 200 hospitaliza-
tions are required to estimate CFR in the range of 0.5 to 1.5%.
Therefore, in this study, the sample size for influenza-A (397
hospitalization and 5267 total cases) and pandemic H1N1 (182
hospitalizations and 2126 total cases) meets the criteria and the
estimated CFR of 0.49 and 0.86% respectively can be considered
precise at 95% confidence interval. At least 1300 total cases and
500 hospitalizations are needed for estimation of CFR of about
0.2%. The precision at 0.2% CFR cannot be obtained with 200
hospitalizations, no matter how large is the initial sample. Thus,
the estimated CFR for seasonal influenza though useful for
comparison with the pandemic H1N1, may not represent the true
estimate. The CFR for different months of the study period varied
between 0.49 and 0.43 for influenza-A, 0.67 and 1.07 for
pandemic H1N1 and 0 and 0.19 for seasonal-A (Table 3). The
high CFR for pandemic influenza in all the 3 months was a
noteworthy feature of the outbreak. Normalized CFR for each age group (Figure 5b) clearly showed a marked increase in fatality risk
with age and highest risk was noted in 40–50 years age group.
Discussion
As observed in some countries of southern hemisphere [14],
within a short period of about 2 weeks after establishment of
indigenous transmission, pandemic H1N1 became one of the
predominant sub-type in Pune and it continued to co-circulate
with seasonal influenza viruses. Unlike in New York City, where
90% of the samples tested were positive for pandemic H1N1 virus
[15], both seasonal-A and pandemic H1N1 were represented in
almost equal proportion in this study. As per our estimation there
were about 11 OPD cases of pandemic H1N1 in the community
for each hospitalized case. This was also considered reasonable by
Figure 3. Age distribution of the IPD cases in Pune (Urban).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010540.g003
Table 2. Calculation of hospitalization ratio from 4 August to
3 September 2009.
Influenza-A Pandemic H1N1 Seasonal-A
OPD cases 4870 1944 2926
IPD cases 397 182 215
Total cases 5267 2126 3141
Hospitalization ratio
IPD/Total cases (%)
7.5 8.6 6.8
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010540.t002
Figure 4. Trends in the cumulative numbers. (a) IPD cases and the
deaths in Pune (Urban) (b) Death cases in Pune.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010540.g004
Severity of Pandemic Influenza
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Wilson and Baker [10]. Unlike in Singapore [16], there was no
evidence of replacement of existing seasonal circulating strains by
pandemic H1N1 virus. Both seasonal and pandemic viruses
continue to circulate even beyond study period (data not shown).
Clearly, both seasonal-A and pandemic H1N1 viruses were
highly active and present in almost equal proportions during the
study period. It provided unique opportunity to study impact of
these viruses independently and also to compare their severity.
The epidemic started in monsoon season and continued with
cyclic pattern. This pattern is similar to that observed for seasonal
influenza in tropics [17–23].
We believe that underreporting during initial phase of the
epidemic was minimal due to the highly vigilant health
department which sprang into action after the first death in Pune.
Significant underreporting of actual OPD cases after the first few
weeks of the infection occurred due to change in policy but IPD
admissions and fatality reporting continued properly even in the
middle of the epidemic. This fact was obvious as two distinct waves
were seen in IPD cases but second wave was diminished in OPD
data. Hospitalization ratio reported here is in line with the reports
from USA and Canada [12]. The cumulative incidence of
hospitalization due to pandemic H1N1 was comparable to that
reported for Argentina, Australia, New Zealand etc [13].
The relationship between hospitalization and death cases
observed by us and in USA and Canada [11] appears to be an
ideal tool to assess the total number of case in the community.
However, this will be true only if available data on hospitalization
is of good quality and the conditions for significant bias are not
present. The higher risk of hospitalization observed by us is
significant and needs to be evaluated in different places.
The significantly higher CFR for pandemic H1N1 in compar-
ison to seasonal-A noted in this study indicates that pandemic
H1N1 is significantly more severe than seasonal-A in tropical
settings like India. The rate is much higher than that reported
from Canada, USA and European countries but matches with the
initial CFR observed in Mexico [12]. On the other hand severity
of seasonal influenza is almost similar to that reported for
developed countries. Although the CFR of pandemic H1N1 is
lower than that reported for ‘Spanish flu’, it is much higher than
those reported for other pandemics of 20th century [24]. The
finding is in contrast to the reports of similar death rates between
pandemic H1N1 and seasonal–A [3,5]. Normalized CFR for each
age group shows a marked increase in fatality risk with age except
in age group .60 years represented by only 1 fatal case. The same
pattern was also observed in Thailand [25]. Relatively few deaths
in seasonal influenza group were reported but comparatively high
fatality was reported in elderly persons.
The CDC proposed an important and new concept ‘Pandemic
severity index’ (PSI) as a new pandemic influenza planning tool for
planning at different places [26]. The PSI is based on case-fatality
ratio as a single criterion to assess severity of pandemic in initial
stages. Five levels of PSI, 1 to 5 were proposed to describe low to
Figure 5. (a) Age-wise distribution of death cases in Pune (b) The
normalized age specific CFR.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010540.g005
Table 3. Calculation of case fatality ratios.
Influenza-A Pandemic H1N1 Seasonal-A Period
Hospitalization rate (Hr) (%) 7.5 8.6 6.8 4 August to 3 September
Deaths/IPD cases (D) 29/397 23/185 6/212 August 2009
CFR (%)* 0.55 1.07 0.19
Death/IPD cases (D) 23/398 21/217 2/181 September 2009
CFR (%)* 0.43 0.83 0.08
Death/IPD cases (D) 13/198 13/167 0/31 October 2009
CFR (%)* 0.49 0.67 0
Total deaths/total IPD cases (D) 65/993 57/569 8/424 1 August to 31 October 2009
Overall CFR (%)* Hr * D (%) 0.49 0.86 0.13
* CFR = Hr*D.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010540.t003
Severity of Pandemic Influenza
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high severity. According to this classification, the pandemics of
1957 and 1968 both fit in category 2, whereas the pandemic of
1918-19 qualified as a category 5. The Pune epidemic of pandemic
H1N1 falls in Category 3 of the severity index.
CFR at country level is often derived using many generalized
assumptions, the validity of which is rarely proved. In a tropical
country like India, large variations have been noticed in the
morbidity and mortality during this pandemic. Higher incidence
of influenza is associated with rainy and winter seasons though
activity continues throughout the year. Therefore, different areas
may experience different levels of influenza related hospitalizations
and fatalities at different times. It is imperative that systematic
studies be conducted in multiple places to arrive at a reasonable
estimate of severity of the pandemic and seasonal influenza viruses.
Mapping of the risk factors to delineate risk zones may provide
better country plans.
This report on severity of influenza infection is based on actual
systematically collected epidemiologic data. Such information
could not be provided earlier due to the lack of dedicated
surveillance of this magnitude. Earlier projections were based on
estimates derived from parallel data collected from other parts of
the world. The similarity of CFR between India, Mexico [2] and
Thailand [25] suggests that the epidemiology of the virus in
tropical settings may be different than that of temperate regions
[10]. In animal experiments with ferrets also, the pandemic H1N1
virus has been found more pathogenic than seasonal influenza
viruses but less pathogenic than 1918 flu virus [27–29].
In summary, in India, pandemic H1N1 virus was associated,
with more severe disease outcomes both in terms of hospitalization
and mortality. The severity of pandemic H1N1 is lower than that
reported for ‘Spanish flu, 1918’ but much higher than reported for
other pandemics of 20th century. Comparatively, the seasonal
influenza produces milder disease with much less mortality.
Materials and Methods
Study area
Pune, located at 18u 319 North latitude and 73u 519 East
longitude, is one of the 35 districts in Maharashtra state, India.
The population of the district is about 7.2 million and of this about
4 million live in Pune Urban Agglomeration (urban). In the
present study, data on hospitalization and samples tested in
laboratory were obtained only for Pune (urban). However, the
data on death cases were available for Pune (urban) and also the
other areas in the district, referred as Pune (rural).
Case definitions
A suspected case of influenza like infection (ILI) was a person
with acute respiratory illness who had fever or a recent history of
fever and sore throat. A suspected case of pandemic H1N1 was a
suspected case of ILI who also had an epidemiological link with a
confirmed pandemic H1N1 virus infection. A confirmed case of
pandemic H1N1 was a ILI case with laboratory confirmation of
pandemic H1N1 virus by real time reverse transcriptase
polymerase chain reaction (rRT-PCR). A confirmed case of
seasonal-A influenza was a suspected case of ILI with laboratory
confirmation of influenza-A by rRT-PCR but negative for
pandemic H1N1. It included un-typable as well as seasonal
H1N1 or H3N2 viruses. A confirmed case of influenza-A included
the cases positive for pandemic H1N1 and seasonal -A.
Laboratory diagnosis
Throat and nasal swabs from the suspected cases, presenting at
outpatient departments (OPD) or admitted in-patient departments
(IPD) of the respiratory units in city hospitals, both in public and
private sectors were collected and transported to the laboratory in
transport medium on ice. All samples were tested by rRT-PCR
following the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
protocol [30] for confirmation of pandemic H1N1 virus and the
WHO protocol [31] for identification of seasonal influenza on ABI
7500 real time PCR machine. Diagnosis was invariably provided
within 24 hours of the receipt of the samples. All patient related
data including demographic details were obtained and entered in a
database created for the purpose. Due to heavy work load, only
limited numbers of samples, randomized, were tested for influenza
B viruses. Limited samples were sub typed to understand
proportional representation between seasonal H1N1 and H3N2
circulating viruses.
Surveillance and data collection
Following the first death on 3 August, an unprecedented level of
surveillance was mounted by the government to monitor influenza
cases. Regular daily meetings involving senior government
officials, health officials and hospital representatives were held
by the district administrative authorities. Duly filled forms
submitted by each hospital were reviewed and systematic reporting
of number of patients screened, admitted and outcome for each
hospitalized patient was ensured.
Initially, due to strong media hype and high level of government
attention, the turnout of patients with any symptom of influenza
was very large and almost all the affected persons presented
themselves to the screening centers. Many such centers were
opened across the city to facilitate active surveillance of the
pandemic. Soon it was impossible to test all the cases and provide
reports in a timely manner. This demanded changes in policy and
the suspected patients were provided with Oseltamivir without
waiting for laboratory results from the second week of September
onwards. Thereafter, only limited samples, collected at the
discretion of the clinicians, from OPD were submitted for testing.
However, systematic sample collection from all the admitted
patients was continued throughout the study period
Calculation of case fatality ratio (CFR)
CFR, the percentage of deaths out of the total confirmed cases
of the disease [25], was determined following the method
suggested by Garske et al [12]. The first stage involved a short
period in the beginning of the outbreak, from 4 August to 3
September, for which reliable data was available on all the cases.
This data was used for determination of ratio between the
hospitalized cases and the total cases, termed as hospitalization
ratio. It was assumed that this hospitalization ratio will hold good
for entire season of the transmission. In the second stage, only
hospitalized cases and deaths were used to estimate the CFR
among hospitalized cases. The CFR was estimated by multiplica-
tion of the hospitalization ratio calculated in the first stage and the
CFR among hospitalized cases in later stages. Overall, CFR was
computed by multiplication of the hospitalization ratio of the first
stage and the CFR among hospitalized cases from 1 August to 31
September 2009. Similarly, CFR was also computed for individual
months during the study.
The normalized age-specific CFR was calculated following de
Silva et.al [24]. It was calculated by dividing the age distribution of
all deceased patients against the age distribution of all confirmed
cases and further dividing each value by the overall CFR for the
total population.
On occasions, when all the samples could not be presented to
the laboratory or all the presented samples could not be tested, the
Severity of Pandemic Influenza
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number of positive cases was derived by multiplying the recorded
cases with the ratio obtained in the samples tested in laboratory.
The ethical clearance for the study was not required since
samples were referred to us for diagnosis as a public health
response to mitigate the pandemic. For the data presented in this
study, the participating patient information remained anonymous.
Acknowledgments
The authors gratefully acknowledge the support and hard work done by all
the members of pandemic influenza teams both from the institute and the
state government during the pandemic. We also acknowledge support
received from Centre for Disease Control, Atlanta, USA for providing the
diagnostic kits and positive controls.
NIV technical team: Buwa B, Chowdhury DT, Dakhave M, Guru
Kumar, Hingulkar R, Jadhav S, Joseph B, Kadam A, Karambelkar SM,
Kawade SN, Keng S, Kengale HK, Khirawale A, Kulkarni PB, Kulkarni
VS, Kumbhar NS, More B, Naik SS, Patil GB, Phaltane RM, Rangole M,
Salunkhe AS, Sonar N, Tikhe SA, Walimbe A.
Government of MaharashtraTeam: Chandrakant Dalvi, Collector Pune;
Mahesh Zagade, Commissioner PMC; Asheesh Sharma, Commissioner
PCMC; Dr. Ashok Ladha, Jt. Director State Health Services; Dr. U.H.
Gawande, Deputy Director Pune Circle and Dr. Pradeep Awate, Assistant
Director In-Charge state flu control room.
Author Contributions
Conceived and designed the experiments: ACM MSC MC. Performed the
experiments: ACM VAP. Analyzed the data: ACM MSC MC VAP.
Contributed reagents/materials/analysis tools: ACM. Wrote the paper:
ACM MSC.
References
1. World Health Organization Pandemic H1N1 2009 update 78. http://www.
who.int/csr/disease/swineflu/en/index.html. Accessed on 11 December 2009.
2. Fraser C, Donnelly CA, Cauchemez S, Hanage W, Van Kerkhove M, et al.
(2009) Pandemic potential of a strain of influenza A (H1N1): early findings.
Science 324: 1557–61.
3. Fox M (2009) Swine flu death rate similar to seasonal flu. Sep 16, 2009; at
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE58E6NZ20090916. Accessed on 11
December 2009.
4. Wang TT, Palese P (2009) Unraveling the mystery of swine influenza virus. Cell
137: 983–5.
5. Collignon P (2009) Take a deep breath Swine flu is not that bad. Australasian
Emergency Nursing Journal 12: 71–72.
6. McConnell J (2009) Influenza in the Asia-Pacific. Lancet Infect Dis 9: 590–1.
7. Murray CJ, Lopez AD, Chin B, Feehan D, Hill KH (2006) Estimation of
potential global pandemic influenza mortality on the basis of vital registry
data from the 1918-20 pandemic: a quantitative analysis. Lancet 368:
2211–8.
8. Michaelis M, Doerr HW, Cinatl J, Jr. (2009) Novel swine-origin influenza A
virus in humans: another pandemic knocking at the door. Med Microbiol
Immunol 198: 175–83.
9. Garten RJ, Davis CT, Russell CA, Shu B, Lindstrom S, et al. (2009) Antigenic
and genetic characteristics of swine-origin 2009 A(H1N1) influenza viruses
circulating in humans. Science 325: 197–201.
10. Wilson N, Baker MG (2009) The emerging influenza pandemic: estimating the
case fatality ratio. Euro Surveill 14: 26.
11. Nishiura H, Klinkenberg D, Roberts M, Heesterbeek JA (2009) Early
epidemiological assessment of the virulence of emerging infectious diseases: a
case study of an influenza pandemic. PLoS One 4: e6852.
12. Garske T, Legrand J, Donnelly CA, Ward H, Cauchemez S, et al. (2009)
Assessing the severity of the novel influenza A/H1N1 pandemic. BMJ 339:
b2840.
13. Chan M World now at the start of 2009 influenza pandemic. http://www.who.
int/mediacentre/news/statements/2009/h1n1_pandemic_phase6_20090611/
en/index.html. Accessed on 9 December 2009.
14. Baker M, Kelly H, Wilson N (2009) Pandemic H1N1 influenza lessons from the
southern hemisphere. Euro Surveill 14: 42.
15. Community transmission of H1N1flu appears to decline in New York City.
New York City Department of Health and Hygiene, N.Y. June 12, 2009, at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/pr2009/pr042-09.shtml accessed on 11
December 2009.
16. Leo Y-S, Lye DC, Barkham T, Krishnan P, Seow E, Chow A (2010) Pandemic
(H1N1) 2009 surveillance and prevalence of seasonal influenza, Singapore.
Emerg Infect Dis. [Epub ahead of print] DOI: 10.3201/eid1601.091164.
17. Hampson AW (1999) Epidemiological data on influenza in Asian countries.
Vaccine 17 Suppl 1: S19–23.
18. Beckett CG, Kosasih H, Ma’roef C, Listiyaningsih E, Elyazar I, et al. (2004)
Influenza surveillance in Indonesia: 1999–2003. Clin Infect Dis 39: 443–449.
19. Hasegawa G, Kyaw Y, Danjuan L, Saitoc R, Suzukic H, et al. (2006) Influenza
virus infections in Yangon, Myanmar. J Clin Virol 37: 233–234.
20. Lee VJ, Chen MI, Chan SP, Wong CS, Cutter J, et al. (2007) Influenza
pandemics in Singapore, a tropical, globally connected city. Emerg Infect Dis
13: 1052–7.
21. Leo YS, Lye DC, Chow A (2009) Influenza in the tropics. Lancet Infect Dis 9:
457–8.
22. Nguyen HL, Saito R, Ngiem HK, Nishikawa M, Shobugawa Y, et al. (2007)
Epidemiology of influenza in Hanoi, Vietnam, from 2001 to 2003. Infect 55:
58–63.
23. Rao BL (2003) Epidemiology and control of Influenza. Natl Med J of India 16:
143–149.
24. Taubenberger JK, Morens DM (2006) 1918 Influenza: the mother of all
pandemics. Emerg Infect Dis 12: 15–22.
25. de Silva UC, Warachit J, Waicharoen S, Chittaganpitch M (2009) A preliminary
analysis of the epidemiology of influenza A(H1N1)v virus infection in Thailand
from early outbreak data, June-July 2009. Euro Surveill 14: 31.
26. Community strategy for pandemic influenza mitigation. CDC 2007 at. http://
www.flu.gov/professional/community/commitigation.html#1V accessed on 9
December 2009..
27. Maines TR, Jayaraman A, Belser JA, Wadford DA, Pappas C, et al. (2009)
Transmission and pathogenesis of swine-origin 2009 A(H1N1) influenza viruses
in Ferrets and mice. Science 325: 484–87.
28. Enserink M (2009) Ferrets Shed Light on New Virus’s Severity and Spread.
Science 325: 17.
29. Munster VJ, de Wit E, van den Brand JM, Herfst S, Schrauwen EJ, et al. (2009)
Pathogenesis and transmission of swine-origin 2009 A(H1N1) influenza virus in
ferrets. Science 325: 481–483.
30. CDC protocol of realtime RTPCR for influenza A (H1N1). Geneva: World
Health Organization, (2009). at http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/
swineflu/CDCRealtimeRTPCR_SwineH1Assay-2009_20090428.pdf.) accessed
on 20 July 2009.
31. World Health Organization (2002) Manual on animal influenza diagnosis and
surveillance, WHO/CDS/CSR/ NCS2002.
Severity of Pandemic Influenza
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 7 May 2010 | Volume 5 | Issue 5 | e10540
